[Serious] A solution to significantly reducing the amount of child pornography available

gymletethnicel

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I personally think this might be a billion dollar solution, but I will give it out for free.

"Dear little underage girls, stop being fucking whores by taking pictures and videos of your nude body and genitals."

That's all.
 
DENSA_IQcel

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Well, this kind of thing falls on the responsibility of parents to properly educate and bring up their children and most parents, at least in the United States, have a very liberal stance on the apparel of their daughters or they just don't really care at all. Of course social media also plays a significant role in influencing the clothing choice of many young girls so this problem probably won't go away because people refuse to take a hard and efficient stance on it. Any criticism of the revealing nature of clothing they wear is met with outrageous claims of sexism and/or virgin shaming. We've gone down a dark timeline no doubt.
 
FinnCel

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Sexual liberation was the biggest mistake in human history
 
kikecel

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*Pedophilia rate drops to 0%*
 
T

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I personally think this might be a billion dollar solution, but I will give it out for free.

"Dear little underage girls, stop being fucking whores by taking pictures and videos of your nude body and genitals."

That's all.
Girls should not be allowed to have mobile devices or access the internet until 21 years of age tbh.
 
Robtical

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How dare you blame the victim? :soy:
 
78980n

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@boojies has some ideas
 
Robtical

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Girls should not be allowed to have mobile devices or access the internet until 21 years of age tbh.
They should never be allowed to use those.
 
cryptic__egg

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Child porn is the product of girls being completely sexually liberated from a young age and then thrown with complete freedom online into environments full of men that are desperate for attention and sex.
 
GoffSystemQB

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There's a lot of child pornography that is legitimately child/toddler rape.

Yeah, I get it's all classed under CP but what people care about and spend more effort on is not a 15-year olds nudes.
 
AlexanderTheGreat11

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UglySlav

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i have a 15yos nudes.there is an ig page that expoes these whores from my town but too high inhib to send because they will have my identity.
(i got the nudes through a chadfish)
 
Wizard32

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Dear little underage girls,
stop being fucking whores by taking pictures and videos of your nude body and genitals
Whores implies they're at least getting paid for it.

Also #1: I disagree with accepting the label 'child' regarding mid-pubescent teen girls who probably constitute the vast majority of these charges.

It's especially absurd calling them "children" when charging crimes for nudes of 17 year olds who are above the agent of consent to actually have sex itself.

News flash: if they are informed/wise enough to consent to actual sex and be treated like adults in that capacity, then they should also be informed/wise enough to consent to having that sex (or even less intrusive stuff like nudes/masturbation) photographed.

It sucks if they didn't give consent to photograph, but we have existing laws on the books which 18+ victims of nudie leaks already use, so just use those.

Also #2 : I disagree with calling nudes (even pics of genitalia) "pornography". I believe it's not pornography unless it actually depicts sexual intercourse. If we look into the etymology, from pornographie (French) to pornographos (Greek) to πορνεία (Ancient Greek) the term literally derives from what they called prostitutes/whores. Their occupation was SEX for money, not baring breasts / pussy for money. It should obviously only refer to selling depictions (graphos) of actual sex, not merely selling voyeurism of bathing/masturbation.

*Pedophilia rate drops to 0%*
Standard jewing here, the majority of nudes come from mid-pubescent girls (not pedophilic in the slightest to fap to them) so restricting them should not influence pedophilia,.

Child porn is the product of girls being completely sexually liberated from a young age and then thrown with complete freedom online into environments full of men that are desperate for attention and sex.
Not ACTUAL child porn, just the vast majority of stuff (ie MID-teen MID-pubescent middle/high school girls taking photos of their tits and sending it to gigachads) which gets wrongly called CP.

We do have situations of ACTUAL children (PRE-teen PRE-pubescent girls in the first six grades called primary/junior/elementary/grade school) involved in ACTUAL porn (depictions of sexual intercourse taking a guy's cock inside them, not merely nudes or masturbation) which does deserve to be called that, and in THAT case I don't know if sexual liberation or online freedom are necessarily the prime causes.

Can sexual liberation and online freedom possibly lead to pre-pubescent girls getting lured by a CP-producer? Sure. But on the other hand, I'm not sure it would actually cause a net increase, because hear me out:
1) sexually repressed girls might be more vulnerable to being lured because they want sexual attention and if only criminals can give it to them, they go to the criminals​
2) girls with online freedom might have more opportunity to report exploitation and predators and share experiences / risk factors with other potential victims. Online freedom could potentially prevent more sexual exploitations than it causes.​

There's a lot of child pornography that is legitimately child/toddler rape.
Define "a lot" and how you confirmed it actually is that much.

Only the FBI knows the true numbers for sure (unless you're some kind of un-captured dark web superstar with a massive database for getting your owns stats), so any hard stats you probably got from claims (((THEY))) release, meaning we can't necessarily trust what % or absolute numbers they report.

The FBI has a potential interest to bloat stats so their division seems more necessary and can get more funding/salaries.

I get it's all classed under CP but
what people care about and spend more effort on is not a 15-year olds nudes.
That depends on what "people" you are talking about.

Yes, in theory the common layperson does care more about keeping the hymens of five-year-olds intact than he does about keeping the hymens of fifteen-year-olds intact.

That's largely why these divisions of law enforcement get such widespread support: people trust the police and assume the resources will be used responsibly, to try and save the most vulnerable victims.

I'm sure there are large amounts of legit good cops who would also make that their priority, to prioritize the ones most victimized.

However: the laws on the books do not REQUIRE this, so it is prone to abuse, with careerist police simply trying to get as many collars as possible to show good performance statistics to keep up funds for their departments.

We don't know that the "good cops" are necessarily the ones drawn to populate these departments and set the priorities for their investigations.

Even if they don't show bias in seeking out easy cases, easy cases are probably the ones that get fed to them. Teen girls (or their parents) angry about their pics getting leaked would flood these departments with the vast majority of cases, because they are adept at navigating social media and standing up for themselves.

In the meantime, the real-serious problems (children so young they are illiterate, parents abusing their kids rather than defending them) aren't going to be spoon-fed to authorities. They would take SERIOUS effort to root out (combing the dark web, hacking passwords, infiltrating communities, overlap with other crimes) and demand far more resources than results.

I'm sure authorities do OCCASIONALLY solve those too (they need metaphorical 'poster children', since identities are protected) to trot out as "examples of our good work" but I question whether or not they do consistently across all departments dedicated the vast majority of their resources to these cases as they ought to.

More likely than not, they probably derail a lot of resources away from these more-deserving cases to tie up "easy cases" of late-teens exhibitionist girls' boobies getting spread around high schools and colleges. They're easier to find and easier to prove, since the guys doing it aren't criminal masterminds kidnapping toddlers use mega-encryption on the dark web.

I'm betting that there are some good cops out there who knows this and are probably seriously pissed off by it, knowing that they're one of the few trying to use police resources responsibly to save ACTUAL victims and not just regret-exhibitionists. But they're probably afraid to whistle-blow about it, because a lot of other cops would get revenge on them for fucking with their high-results trickery and exposing the corrupted number-hunting many departments probably engage in to come ahead in performance of higher-morality competing officers.
 
GoffSystemQB

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Define "a lot" and how you confirmed it actually is that much.

Only the FBI knows the true numbers for sure (unless you're some kind of un-captured dark web superstar with a massive database for getting your owns stats), so any hard stats you probably got from claims (((THEY))) release, meaning we can't necessarily trust what % or absolute numbers they report.

The FBI has a potential interest to bloat stats so their division seems more necessary and can get more funding/salaries.
Intuition. Most of the people who chase after CP chase after the extreme stuff. Just like any other porn/fetish. Someone who's an ephebophile can easily just watch the "teen" category on pornhub.

In the meantime, the real-serious problems (children so young they are illiterate, parents abusing their kids rather than defending them) aren't going to be spoon-fed to authorities. They would take SERIOUS effort to root out (combing the dark web, hacking passwords, infiltrating communities, overlap with other crimes) and demand far more resources than results.
I'm pretty sure they do all of that stuff.

More likely than not, they probably derail a lot of resources away from these more-deserving cases to tie up "easy cases" of late-teens exhibitionist girls' boobies getting spread around high schools and colleges. They're easier to find and easier to prove, since the guys doing it aren't criminal masterminds kidnapping toddlers use mega-encryption on the dark web.
Disagree those things/cases are "easy" and don't require a lot of effort. Just teenagers being teenagers.
 
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cryptic__egg

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Not ACTUAL child porn, just the vast majority of stuff (ie MID-teen MID-pubescent middle/high school girls taking photos of their tits and sending it to gigachads) which gets wrongly called CP.

We do have situations of ACTUAL children (PRE-teen PRE-pubescent girls in the first six grades called primary/junior/elementary/grade school) involved in ACTUAL porn (depictions of sexual intercourse taking a guy's cock inside them, not merely nudes or masturbation) which does deserve to be called that, and in THAT case I don't know if sexual liberation or online freedom are necessarily the prime causes.

Can sexual liberation and online freedom possibly lead to pre-pubescent girls getting lured by a CP-producer? Sure. But on the other hand, I'm not sure it would actually cause a net increase, because hear me out:
1) sexually repressed girls might be more vulnerable to being lured because they want sexual attention and if only criminals can give it to them, they go to the criminals2) girls with online freedom might have more opportunity to report exploitation and predators and share experiences / risk factors with other potential victims. Online freedom could potentially prevent more sexual exploitations than it causes.
Agreed, but in the ongoing fight against child porn normies are usually referring to the nudes of a 15 year old rather than an actual little girl.
 
Wizard32

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Most of the people who chase after CP chase after the extreme stuff.
Just like any other porn/fetish.
Someone who's an ephebophile can easily just watch the "teen" category on pornhub.
Firstly: please abandon "ephebe" prefix, that refers to adolescent males (gay shit)

If you must choose something, "hebe" is better, Greek Goddess of Youth.

Anyway: the FBI would go after the teen section of pornhub to arrest peopel for 16/17 year old nudes if it were feasible.

The only reason they wouldn't is because that's full of fakes ("teen" girls 20-29 years old) and legals ("teen" girls 18-19) both of which would be hard to discern from 15/16 year olds based on looks alone

However when they can actually ID a foid by age (know they were underage) they are going to prosecute the hell out of that to bloat their stats.

I'm pretty sure they do all of that stuff.
I said they did: but just occasionally to march out the "here's an example, assume all our other cases are like this"

I don't think they commit many resources to it though, since it's high-effort to get those convictions compared to low-effort convictions they can get from protecting high-school exhibitionists.

Disagree those things/cases are "easy" and don't require a lot of effort.
Just teenagers being teenagers.
I'm not sure you are understanding what I wrote here.

It's easy to prosecute an incel for having a 17 year old stacie's nude. Basically she sends it to gigachad who sends it to chadlite who sends it to incels and then they privately laugh until one sends it back to her to make her cry, then she reports to cops who then arrest EVERYONE.

Example case:


We should also acknowledge cases like this one : https://michiganchronicle.com/2017/...years-in-prison-for-sexting-female-classmate/

Cops won't just prosecute men for getting nudes from foids, but also if a foid convinces them to send a dick pic, they can be arrested with themselves being the "victim" of producing CP or sending to CP to a minor (even though the minor is same age).
 
GoffSystemQB

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I'm not sure you are understanding what I wrote here.

It's easy to prosecute an incel for having a 17 year old stacie's nude. Basically she sends it to gigachad who sends it to chadlite who sends it to incels and then they privately laugh until one sends it back to her to make her cry, then she reports to cops who then arrest EVERYONE.

Example case:

We should also acknowledge cases like this one : https://michiganchronicle.com/2017/...years-in-prison-for-sexting-female-classmate/

Cops won't just prosecute men for getting nudes from foids, but also if a foid convinces them to send a dick pic, they can be arrested with themselves being the "victim" of producing CP or sending to CP to a minor (even though the minor is same age).
Ngl, that case is pretty surprising. But they're not going to go after people who just "view it" like other forms of more extreme stuff or at least nearly as harshly.

I don't know what happened with each case in court either, but I'd imagine dissemination is usually worse.

Still my point was it doesn't take that much resources to get everyone in high school that sent/received the images. Compared to the operations required to crack down on more extreme stuff.
 
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manicel

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yeshuallah

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I’m ok with cp(chicken pizza)
 
MountainGorilla

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Well, this kind of thing falls on the responsibility of parents to properly educate and bring up their children and most parents, at least in the United States, have a very liberal stance on the apparel of their daughters or they just don't really care at all. Of course social media also plays a significant role in influencing the clothing choice of many young girls so this problem probably won't go away because people refuse to take a hard and efficient stance on it. Any criticism of the revealing nature of clothing they wear is met with outrageous claims of sexism and/or virgin shaming. We've gone down a dark timeline no doubt.
most parents aren't ready to have kids. They just fuck like rabbits and send their kid to school because they weren't prepared to have one.
 
anon2719

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I don't know if lolicon Japanese porn is CP but, if it is there is a ton of it on the internet that will never go away
 
DENSA_IQcel

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most parents aren't ready to have kids. They just fuck like rabbits and send their kid to school because they weren't prepared to have one.
Yep, they just decide to have children because it 'feels right' and give no thought to the long-term consequences of their choice. They never stop and wonder if they're actually fit for the job, both morally and genetically, of raising children.
 
FIVETHREEBALDCEL

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i have a 15yos nudes.there is an ig page that expoes these whores from my town but too high inhib to send because they will have my identity.
(i got the nudes through a chadfish)
I got nudes of my chadlite classmate's gf by hacking his laptop, we could exchange and leak it
 
metabuxx

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Based advice.
Once whores stop being whores, there'd be no child porn.
 
Napoleon de Geso

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legalise ephebohilic and hebephilic stuff
 
Excluded

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Based. Stop giving underage whores mobile phones theory
 
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First, you should realize that the CP situation is a moral panic.


Moral Panic and Child Pornography

The public’s fear of child pornography that began in the 1970s and escalated with the emergence of the Internet, has all the makings of moral panic.
By definition, moral panic is the sudden eruption of outrage towards a specific group disproportionate to any harm caused. Cohen (1972) was first to coin the term and his definition more specifically includes: (1) concern about the potential or imagined threat; (2) moral outrage toward the actors who embody the problem; (3) widespread agreement that the threat exists and that something should be done about it; (4) an exaggeration of the number or strength of cases, in terms of damages, moral offensiveness, and risks if ignored; and (5) the panic erupts and dissipates suddenly without warning. Garland (2008) added two more elements: (1) the actors who embody the problem are viewed as threatening to the status quo; and (2) without action, they risk destroying society. Jenkins (1998) and others have invoked Cohen’s model of moral panic to explain societal fear of child pornography. Jenkins (2001) claims that it was during the initial crusade against child pornography in the 1970s that moral crusaders competed to assert the most incendiary claims about child pornography, including that it was a well-organized, multi-billion dollar industry and that the number of children exploited was in the millions. Jenkins (2001) notes that while most of these claims were discredited, fear persisted. As Walker (2010) describes: “Anxiety over child sexual abuse and the inability to protect children from harm is a salient fear in present society. Despite other, more probable dangers, these issues remain a large concern. Moreover, they are an agreed upon social harm. Child sexual abuse is decried unanimously as a moral wrong and a violation of social norms.” (p.198) Similarly, Ost (2002) explains that the main causes of the moral panic over child pornography “are the moral values which affirm the sacred status of the child and the rights that our society has ascribed to children.” (p.443)

The only criterion of Cohen’s moral panic model that appears not to have been met in the case of child pornography offenders is the fifth. Meaning, at this time, there is no dissipation of the panic. Unlike other panics such as the Salem Witch trials or the crack cocaine epidemic, both of which had a start and end date, the panic over child sexual exploitation has been durable, long-lasting and now in its fourth decade (O’Hear, 2008). Walker (2010) argues the only thing that has changed with the child pornography panic is the fervent role of the state in responding. The federal government has created a number of laws intended to severely punish and control child pornography offenders.
Restricting access to CP is predicted by science to cause an increase to the child sexual abuse rate.


Could making child pornography legal lead to lower rates of child sex abuse? It could well do, according to a new study by Milton Diamond, from the University of Hawaii, and colleagues.

Results from the Czech Republic showed, as seen everywhere else studied (Canada, Croatia, Denmark, Germany, Finland, Hong Kong, Shanghai, Sweden, USA), that rape and other sex crimes have not increased following the legalization and wide availability of pornography. And most significantly, the incidence of child sex abuse has fallen considerably since 1989, when child pornography became readily accessible – a phenomenon also seen in Denmark and Japan. Their findings are published online today in Springer’s journal Archives of Sexual Behavior.

The findings support the theory that potential sexual offenders use child pornography as a substitute for sex crimes against children

One concern is that the accessibility of online CP has caused increases in child sexual abuse. Some research suggests that CP may trigger sexual abuse by activating and validating sexual urges in CP viewers that were previously suppressed or con- trolled (Beech et al., 2008; Quayle & Taylor, 2003; Wilson & Jones, 2008). There is no evidence of increasing abuse in the United States, however. In fact, rates of child sexual abuse have declined substantially since the mid-1990s, a time period that corresponds to the spread of CP online. Statistics from U.S. child protective service agencies show that from 1992 to 2007, child sexual abuse declined 53% (Jones & Finkelhor, 2009), including interfamilial abuse (Finkelhor & Jones, 2006). Evidence of this decline also comes from victim self-report surveys and U.S. criminal justice system data (Finkelhor & Jones, 2008; Finkelhor, Turner, Ormrod, & Hamby, 2010), as well as the child pro-tective services data collection system. The fact that this trend is revealed in multiple sources tends to undermine arguments that it is because of reduced reporting or changes in investigatory or statistical procedures.
It's trivial enough to block access to an enormous amount of CP.


Child exploitation experts say the global bust does not mean the online universe is now child-porn free. The lion's share of these images and videos are disseminated for free via e-mail and peer-to-peer file sharing between individuals, who often belong to trust-based clubs.

Over a one year period, we observed over 1.8 million distinct peers on eMule and over 700,000 peers on Gnutella, from over 100 countries, sharing hundreds of thou- sands of files verified as CP.
A lot of it is distributed over regular P2P networks still, as knowledge of secure systems like Tor takes time to disseminate throughout the general population.


Democrat Joe Biden at Capitol Hill hearing urges more police to be trained in software developed by agent specializing in searching for child pornography.

WASHINGTON--A prominent Senate Democrat on Wednesday said federal and local police should use custom software to monitor peer-to-peer networks for illegal activity, and he wants to spend $1 billion in tax dollars to help make that happen.
Biden and Sen. Jeff Sessions (R-Ala.), the committee's ranking member, said they were troubled that because of limited resources, investigators are able to take on less than 2 percent of what they called "known" cases of child-pornography trafficking via the Internet.
(Even though it isn't clear what they mean by "cases," as it could mean identified peers or arrested peers. Nevertheless, CP viewing prevalence has been increasing over the past several decades).


BALTIMORE (WJZ)– The number of child pornography cases in Maryland is skyrocketing, doubling in the past two years–fueled by new technology, Maryland State Police say.
Just as people seeding traditional files can have their internet shut down until they stop seeding them, people seeding CP can simply have their ISPs disconnect them from the Internet. It's not as if the FBI et al. are without those ~2,500,000 IP addresses that network forensic operation uncovered. They could always just tell ISPs to disconnect those customers from the Internet, similarly to how the RIAA does in relation to music files. Files transferred in cleartext can trivially be identified with DPI techniques implemented at the ISP, such that this content can be automatically filtered at the ISP level.


Deep packet inspection (DPI) is a type of data processing that inspects in detail the data being sent over a computer network, and usually takes action by blocking, re-routing, or logging it accordingly.

Content classification defines what type of data is transferred and what meaning the data has. In most cases, content classification only considers the type of data, such as pictures or movies, but in some cases, the meaning of the data is of interest. Content classification is especially effective on unique Internet traffic. The Google logo is transferred millions of times every day, however, it is not unique; itis classified once, put into a reference table, and never revisited. The same goes for most web and p2p content. Combined with context classification, a resulting data set would say "XY downloaded a nude picture of Angelina Jolie from webpage Z". The resulting dataset will be less then 200 bytes, regardless of picture size, and by the time the first 5 to 10 packets are transferred, the connection has already been analyzed21. One real-life example of this technique is a Bundeskriminalamt22 operation under the auspices of stopping child pornography. It references known child pornography images, generates a reference, and then watches to see if those references appear in network traffic. The effect is that they will instantly know if anyone on their network is sending or receiving such images.
Even with encryption, follow-up-probing after traffic classification should be able to identify an encrypted CP flow in a P2P context.


Website Fingerprinting (WF) is a class of attacks that exploit metadata leakage to attack end-user privacy on the Internet. In the WF threat model, Adv is assumed to be a passive and local attacker.Local means that Adv can associate traffic with a given client.Examples include proxies to which clients directly connect. Passive means that Adv can only view traffic in transit. It cannot add, drop, or otherwise modify packets between the victim client and server(s). Use of reliable and encrypted transport protocols such as TLS limit on-path attackers to eavesdropping on encrypted packets. (In QUIC, however, reordering packets is possible.) Traffic features used for classification include properties such as packet size, timing, direction, interarrival times, and burstiness, among many others [wang2016 website]. Normally, features are restricted to those which are extractable as a passive eavesdropper, and not those which are viewable by modifying client or server behavior. Specifically, this means that attacks such as CRIME[CRIME] and TIME [TIME], which rely on an attacker abusing TLS-layer compression to leak contents of an encrypted connection, are out of scope.
Essentially, known CP files are specific byte counts, and if someone is detected through an encrypted link as using a given P2P protocol,


Different techniques can be used to classify IP traffic. The simplest method is to identify the application that gener-ated each flow by its transport level source and destination ports [1].
Our approach belongs to yet another class of techniques, those which try to classify network traffic relying exclusively on the statistical properties of the flows (see for example [4,5]). The key idea behind our work is that the statistical properties of basic elements of each network flow, i.e., the size of the IP packets, their inter-arrival time and the order in which they are seen at the classifier should be sufficient to determine which application layer protocol generated the traffic.
to send a file of a given byte count that matches a known byte count of a CP file -- especially if we don't "miss the forest for the trees."


Website fingerprinting attacks can reveal the receiver in anonymous networks and cause a potential threat to users' privacy. Previous studies focus more on identifying individual webpages. They also neglect the hyperlink transition information, because it induces extra “noise” to classify the original webpage. However, it is a common scenario that the users surf a website by clicking hyperlinks on the webpage. In this paper, we propose a website modeling method based on profile hidden Markov model (PHMM) which is widely used in bioinformatics for DNA sequencing analysis. Our technique explicitly accounts for possible hyperlink transitions made by users when fingerprinting a target website, and therefore can work in a more realistic environment than existing methods. Using SSH and Shadowsocks, we collect various data sets and conduct extensive evaluations. We also show that our approach could work both in webpage and website identification in a closed world setting. The experimental results demonstrate that our website fingerprinting is more accurate and robust than existing methods.

The authors performed separate open-world and closed-world experi-ments. In the open-world experiments, the attacker gathered a num-ber of traffic instances of 5 specific monitored sites and 1 instance each from a large set of 4000 non-monitored sites; the simulated client could choose a monitored site or one from another set of1000 non-monitored sites. In the closed-world experiments, the at-tacker gathered a number of traffic instances from a limited set of sites and the client was only allowed to choose among those sites.
which is to say that a peer sharing CP on such a network is not likely to be making only a single CP file available, but rather to have numerous such files, each of which being a distinct byte count, and each of which (potentially, depending on multiplexing) being individually observable (even if in ciphertext only) in transit. Even if a client is sharing some unseen non-CP file with a byte count exactly equal to that of a known CP file, and therefore a false positive identification of it as a CP file manifests, it could just serve to increment their "shared files that are potentially known CP" count -- clients with higher such counts are more likely to be sharing CP. However, follow up probing can be used after traffic classifiers classify an encrypted flow as being known CP files.


As an example of a reactive probing attack, recently the Chinese Great FireWall was observed conducting two follow-up probes for each out-bound port TCP/443 connection. While the target of the first set of probes with garbage binary data was unknown, the second set specifically targeted Tor by performing an SSL negotiation, an SSL renegotiation and successfully building a one-hop Tor circuit [21].
In the context of gnutella, this could be done simply by sending the IP address associated with the flow detected as CP a Query packet for the known name of the file, followed up by (preferably fuzzy) hashing the received plaintext file to ensure that it matches the target file.


2.1 Query-Query Hit Exchange Mechanism

Information lookup in the Gnutella system is performed using Query flooding or controlled Query flooding, known as Dynamic Querying. In both cases, nodes broadcast a Query packet, which embeds the search criteria, to some or all oftheir first-hop neighbors. The Query packet is forwarded to the system until its TTL becomes zero. In each forwarding step the TTL of the Query packet TTL is decremented by one and a “HOPs” counter is incremented. Along the paths on which the Query propagates, every node of the system is free to answer by issuing a QueryHit packet. A QueryHit packet travels back to the originator of the Query following the same path of the Query packet. It is important tonote that there is no central mechanism to confirm whether peers generating QueryHit packets actually hold a file that matches the search criteria of the original Query.


.



Based. Stop giving underage whores mobile phones theory
Imagine a browser that lacks right clicking to save images. This allows the browser to render its images, yet provides a degree of protection from the unauthorized dissemination of the rendered images: It prevents the viewer from saving the images, and therefore their "out of band" distribution. Snapchat is a similar system.



One of the principal features of Snapchat is that pictures and messages are usually only available for a short time before they become inaccessible to their recipients.
Vanish was another.


Vanish was a project to "give users control over the lifetime of personal data stored on the web." It was led by Roxana Geambasu at the University of Washington.[1] The project proposes to allow a user to enter information that he or she will send out across the internet, thereby relinquishing control of it. However, the user is able to include an "expiration date," after which the information is no longer usable by anyone who may have a copy of it, even the creator.[2] The Vanish approach was found to be vulnerable to a Sybil attack, and thus insecure, by a team called Unvanish from the University of Texas, University of Michigan, and Princeton.[3]
Such systems typically fail to protect from a variety of even trivial bypass attacks -- both logical and physical. In the previous example -- of a browser without an image saving mechanism -- the user could simply use the "print screen" button of the keyboard. This would allow the images -- rendered in the browser -- to be saved, despite the lack of mechanism for saving them from the browser.





That is a screenshot of Qubes, which is a general purpose operating system that implements security by virtual machine based isolation. The different window border colors represent different security domains, which actually are built on top of their own operating system kernels and which are isolated by the Xen hypervisor. Virtual machines are easier to think of in terms of virtualbox -- where you can see how there is an entire separate operating system "underneath of" the individual applications.





That screenshot shows Windows running in virtualbox on a Linux host system. When you click into the Windows OS, the mouse and keyboard will be "locked into" it, such that a special key sequence needs to be pressed to "unlock" from it. Prior to unlocking from guest operating system window, mouse movements and keystrokes take place inside of it -- as if it were a separate monitor displaying a separate operating system with separate hard drives, networking cards, and so on. If one were to hit the "print screen" button while locked into the Windows OS, only the Windows operating system window would have a screenshot taken of it, and it would be inside the Windows OS such that saving it to the filesystem would put it under -- say -- c:\\, rather than -- as on Linux -- /.


For cellphones and tablets, one may desire to look into SEL4, for it is with a proof of correctness on ARM based systems, such that, provided the correctness of the proof, logic level escapes from security domains are impossible. Most cellphones and tablets use ARM processors, which is why I mention it.



seL4 is the most advanced member of the L4 microkernel family, notable for its comprehensive formal verification, which sets it apart from any other operating system. seL4 achieves this without compromising performance.
With such systems as Virtualbox based isolation,



in order to get a screenshot such as this, one must be "unlocked" from any of the given guest machines, such that keystrokes and mouse movements are directed to the host operating system. One can trivially imagine a new generation of smartphones and tablets that by default keep one from accessing the host operating system, rather locking one into one of the guest operating systems. This is already essentially how tablets and cellphones are, it's just that instead of using virtualization like this they use discretionary unix access controls and attempt to prevent users from getting a root account.


If we had such a software architecture with modern cellphones and tablets, we could implement the camera functionality -- or a subset of it -- such that it was isolated in a dedicated virtual machine. This could be done with something similar to pci passthrough with IOMMU -- in terms of desktop/laptop systems.


PCI passthrough allows you to give control of physical devices to guests: that is, you can use PCI passthrough to assign a PCI device (NIC, disk controller, HBA, USB controller, firewire controller, soundcard, etc) to a virtual machine guest, giving it full and direct access to the PCI device.
Having a separate security domain dedicated to the camera -- perhaps even with its persistence layer from a ROM chip --




Read-only memory (ROM) is a type of non-volatile memory used in computers and other electronic devices. Data stored in ROM cannot be electronically modified after the manufacture of the memory device. Read-only memory is useful for storing software that is rarely changed during the life of the system, sometimes known as firmware. Software applications for programmable devices can be distributed as plug-in cartridges containing read-only memory.

will allow for taking pictures -- as well as sending pictures to other devices (perhaps after ascertaining over the network that they are the same style of device) -- such that they are in a domain without screenshot functionality implemented in it. Because the domain with camera access is isolated away from the general purpose domain, taking a screenshot in the general purpose domain will fail to screenshot the domain that has the picture stored in it. The domain with the picture stored in it can be very "locked down" to prevent unwanted persistence, such that logic as Snapchat (presumably) uses can actually prevent the persistence of the therein stored images.


The domain with the camera access can even be physically isolated, similar to a Tor Router and workstation.





It could even be with a physical switch that redirects the camera from the general purpose domain to a secondary domain that is for more sensitive photographs, with the more sensitive physical domain being entirely from ROM such that it can't easily be modified to include any screenshot applications, with a protocol with an objective similar to snapshots, but to ascertain the other device being communicated with is part of the secure system. This could be done with something similar to a TPM,







This will go a long way toward preventing logic based bypass attacks. However, there is still the issue of a physical bypass attack. After all, what is to stop someone from using a different device to take a picture of the screen of the phone?



Here we could use something like is already done with currency to prevent it from being scanned. A widespread -- but not, I believe, the best -- system for preventing the scanning of currency is the EURion configuration.








If the isolated 'secure photograph' domain automatically embeds such a pattern into taken photographs -- and cameras are programmed to not photograph the watermarked photographs -- then it can be made more challenging to use a physical bypass of the access control system to bring the image outside of it without authorization.


Public watermarks allow embedded signals to be extracted from audio and video content for a variety of purposes. One application is for copyright control, where it is envisaged that digital video recorders will not permit the recording of content that is watermarked as "never copy". In such a scenario, it is important that the watermark survive both normal signal transformations and attempts to remove the watermark so that an illegal copy can be made.
I know people who have worked on photocopier systems for preventing currency from being copied, and they told me that even after a great deal of manipulation -- to the point that the actual currency image itself can't even be recognized as such -- the algorithms used were still able to detect the watermark such that the photocopiers refused to copy the marked elements.

With protection from application level attacks from the virtual and/or physical isolation, TPM like security to ascertain the integrity of participating devices, and the watermarking technique coupled with firmware in new generation devices that disallows taking photographs of images with a certain watermark, I think that something like snapchat could actually be made a lot more robust.


Lightweight virtualization using containers is a technique that has finally come together for Linux, though there are still some rough edges that may need filing down. Containers are created by using two separate kernel features: control groups (cgroups) and namespaces. Cgroups are in the process of being revamped, while there may still need to be more namespaces added to the varieties currently available. For example, there is no way to separate most devices into their own namespace. That's a hole that Oren Laadan would like to see filled, so he put out an RFC on device namespaces recently.
Laadan and his colleagues at Cellrox have put together a set of patches based on the 3.4 kernel for the Android emulator (goldfish). There is also a fairly detailed description of the patches and the changes made for both stateless and stateful devices. An Android-based demo that switches between a running phone and an app that displays a changing color palette has also been created.
 
Last edited:
MountainGorilla

MountainGorilla

Postmaxxing anime avi halo piece of shit
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First, you should realize that the CP situation is a moral panic.




Restricting access to CP is predicted by science to cause an increase to the child sexual abuse rate.







It's trivial enough to block access to an enormous amount of CP.







A lot of it is distributed over regular P2P networks still, as knowledge of secure systems like Tor takes time to disseminate throughout the general population.






(Even though it isn't clear what they mean by "cases," as it could mean identified peers or arrested peers. Nevertheless, CP viewing prevalence has been increasing over the past several decades).




Just as people seeding traditional files can have their internet shut down until they stop seeding them, people seeding CP can simply have their ISPs disconnect them from the Internet. It's not as if the FBI et al. are without those ~2,500,000 IP addresses that network forensic operation uncovered. They could always just tell ISPs to disconnect those customers from the Internet, similarly to how the RIAA does in relation to music files. Files transferred in cleartext can trivially be identified with DPI techniques implemented at the ISP, such that this content can be automatically filtered at the ISP level.







Even with encryption, follow-up-probing after traffic classification should be able to identify an encrypted CP flow in a P2P context.



Essentially, known CP files are specific byte counts, and if someone is detected through an encrypted link as using a given P2P protocol,






to send a file of a given byte count that matches a known byte count of a CP file -- especially if we don't "miss the forest for the trees."







which is to say that a peer sharing CP on such a network is not likely to be making only a single CP file available, but rather to have numerous such files, each of which being a distinct byte count, and each of which (potentially, depending on multiplexing) being individually observable (even if in ciphertext only) in transit. Even if a client is sharing some unseen non-CP file with a byte count exactly equal to that of a known CP file, and therefore a false positive identification of it as a CP file manifests, it could just serve to increment their "shared files that are potentially known CP" count -- clients with higher such counts are more likely to be sharing CP. However, follow up probing can be used after traffic classifiers classify an encrypted flow as being known CP files.




In the context of gnutella, this could be done simply by sending the IP address associated with the flow detected as CP a Query packet for the known name of the file, followed up by (preferably fuzzy) hashing the received plaintext file to ensure that it matches the target file.






Imagine a browser that lacks right clicking to save images. This allows the browser to render its images, yet provides a degree of protection from the unauthorized dissemination of the rendered images: It prevents the viewer from saving the images, and therefore their "out of band" distribution. Snapchat is a similar system.





Vanish was another.




Such systems typically fail to protect from a variety of even trivial bypass attacks -- both logical and physical. In the previous example -- of a browser without an image saving mechanism -- the user could simply use the "print screen" button of the keyboard. This would allow the images -- rendered in the browser -- to be saved, despite the lack of mechanism for saving them from the browser.





That is a screenshot of Qubes, which is a general purpose operating system that implements security by virtual machine based isolation. The different window border colors represent different security domains, which actually are built on top of their own operating system kernels and which are isolated by the Xen hypervisor. Virtual machines are easier to think of in terms of virtualbox -- where you can see how there is an entire separate operating system "underneath of" the individual applications.





That screenshot shows Windows running in virtualbox on a Linux host system. When you click into the Windows OS, the mouse and keyboard will be "locked into" it, such that a special key sequence needs to be pressed to "unlock" from it. Prior to unlocking from guest operating system window, mouse movements and keystrokes take place inside of it -- as if it were a separate monitor displaying a separate operating system with separate hard drives, networking cards, and so on. If one were to hit the "print screen" button while locked into the Windows OS, only the Windows operating system window would have a screenshot taken of it, and it would be inside the Windows OS such that saving it to the filesystem would put it under -- say -- c:\\, rather than -- as on Linux -- /.


For cellphones and tablets, one may desire to look into SEL4, for it is with a proof of correctness on ARM based systems, such that, provided the correctness of the proof, logic level escapes from security domains are impossible. Most cellphones and tablets use ARM processors, which is why I mention it.





With such systems as Virtualbox based isolation,



in order to get a screenshot such as this, one must be "unlocked" from any of the given guest machines, such that keystrokes and mouse movements are directed to the host operating system. One can trivially imagine a new generation of smartphones and tablets that by default keep one from accessing the host operating system, rather locking one into one of the guest operating systems. This is already essentially how tablets and cellphones are, it's just that instead of using virtualization like this they use discretionary unix access controls and attempt to prevent users from getting a root account.


If we had such a software architecture with modern cellphones and tablets, we could implement the camera functionality -- or a subset of it -- such that it was isolated in a dedicated virtual machine. This could be done with something similar to pci passthrough with IOMMU -- in terms of desktop/laptop systems.




Having a separate security domain dedicated to the camera -- perhaps even with its persistence layer from a ROM chip --







will allow for taking pictures -- as well as sending pictures to other devices (perhaps after ascertaining over the network that they are the same style of device) -- such that they are in a domain without screenshot functionality implemented in it. Because the domain with camera access is isolated away from the general purpose domain, taking a screenshot in the general purpose domain will fail to screenshot the domain that has the picture stored in it. The domain with the picture stored in it can be very "locked down" to prevent unwanted persistence, such that logic as Snapchat (presumably) uses can actually prevent the persistence of the therein stored images.


The domain with the camera access can even be physically isolated, similar to a Tor Router and workstation.





It could even be with a physical switch that redirects the camera from the general purpose domain to a secondary domain that is for more sensitive photographs, with the more sensitive physical domain being entirely from ROM such that it can't easily be modified to include any screenshot applications, with a protocol with an objective similar to snapshots, but to ascertain the other device being communicated with is part of the secure system. This could be done with something similar to a TPM,







This will go a long way toward preventing logic based bypass attacks. However, there is still the issue of a physical bypass attack. After all, what is to stop someone from using a different device to take a picture of the screen of the phone?



Here we could use something like is already done with currency to prevent it from being scanned. A widespread -- but not, I believe, the best -- system for preventing the scanning of currency is the EURion configuration.








If the isolated 'secure photograph' domain automatically embeds such a pattern into taken photographs -- and cameras are programmed to not photograph the watermarked photographs -- then it can be made more challenging to use a physical bypass of the access control system to bring the image outside of it without authorization.




I know people who have worked on photocopier systems for preventing currency from being copied, and they told me that even after a great deal of manipulation -- to the point that the actual currency image itself can't even be recognized as such -- the algorithms used were still able to detect the watermark such that the photocopiers refused to copy the marked elements.

With protection from application level attacks from the virtual and/or physical isolation, TPM like security to ascertain the integrity of participating devices, and the watermarking technique coupled with firmware in new generation devices that disallows taking photographs of images with a certain watermark, I think that something like snapchat could actually be made a lot more robust.

bump
 
Smitty

Smitty

Take down the US Government (in Hoi4)
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First, you should realize that the CP situation is a moral panic.




Restricting access to CP is predicted by science to cause an increase to the child sexual abuse rate.







It's trivial enough to block access to an enormous amount of CP.







A lot of it is distributed over regular P2P networks still, as knowledge of secure systems like Tor takes time to disseminate throughout the general population.






(Even though it isn't clear what they mean by "cases," as it could mean identified peers or arrested peers. Nevertheless, CP viewing prevalence has been increasing over the past several decades).




Just as people seeding traditional files can have their internet shut down until they stop seeding them, people seeding CP can simply have their ISPs disconnect them from the Internet. It's not as if the FBI et al. are without those ~2,500,000 IP addresses that network forensic operation uncovered. They could always just tell ISPs to disconnect those customers from the Internet, similarly to how the RIAA does in relation to music files. Files transferred in cleartext can trivially be identified with DPI techniques implemented at the ISP, such that this content can be automatically filtered at the ISP level.







Even with encryption, follow-up-probing after traffic classification should be able to identify an encrypted CP flow in a P2P context.




Essentially, known CP files are specific byte counts, and if someone is detected through an encrypted link as using a given P2P protocol,






to send a file of a given byte count that matches a known byte count of a CP file -- especially if we don't "miss the forest for the trees."







which is to say that a peer sharing CP on such a network is not likely to be making only a single CP file available, but rather to have numerous such files, each of which being a distinct byte count, and each of which (potentially, depending on multiplexing) being individually observable (even if in ciphertext only) in transit. Even if a client is sharing some unseen non-CP file with a byte count exactly equal to that of a known CP file, and therefore a false positive identification of it as a CP file manifests, it could just serve to increment their "shared files that are potentially known CP" count -- clients with higher such counts are more likely to be sharing CP. However, follow up probing can be used after traffic classifiers classify an encrypted flow as being known CP files.




In the context of gnutella, this could be done simply by sending the IP address associated with the flow detected as CP a Query packet for the known name of the file, followed up by (preferably fuzzy) hashing the received plaintext file to ensure that it matches the target file.






.





Imagine a browser that lacks right clicking to save images. This allows the browser to render its images, yet provides a degree of protection from the unauthorized dissemination of the rendered images: It prevents the viewer from saving the images, and therefore their "out of band" distribution. Snapchat is a similar system.





Vanish was another.




Such systems typically fail to protect from a variety of even trivial bypass attacks -- both logical and physical. In the previous example -- of a browser without an image saving mechanism -- the user could simply use the "print screen" button of the keyboard. This would allow the images -- rendered in the browser -- to be saved, despite the lack of mechanism for saving them from the browser.





That is a screenshot of Qubes, which is a general purpose operating system that implements security by virtual machine based isolation. The different window border colors represent different security domains, which actually are built on top of their own operating system kernels and which are isolated by the Xen hypervisor. Virtual machines are easier to think of in terms of virtualbox -- where you can see how there is an entire separate operating system "underneath of" the individual applications.





That screenshot shows Windows running in virtualbox on a Linux host system. When you click into the Windows OS, the mouse and keyboard will be "locked into" it, such that a special key sequence needs to be pressed to "unlock" from it. Prior to unlocking from guest operating system window, mouse movements and keystrokes take place inside of it -- as if it were a separate monitor displaying a separate operating system with separate hard drives, networking cards, and so on. If one were to hit the "print screen" button while locked into the Windows OS, only the Windows operating system window would have a screenshot taken of it, and it would be inside the Windows OS such that saving it to the filesystem would put it under -- say -- c:\\, rather than -- as on Linux -- /.


For cellphones and tablets, one may desire to look into SEL4, for it is with a proof of correctness on ARM based systems, such that, provided the correctness of the proof, logic level escapes from security domains are impossible. Most cellphones and tablets use ARM processors, which is why I mention it.





With such systems as Virtualbox based isolation,



in order to get a screenshot such as this, one must be "unlocked" from any of the given guest machines, such that keystrokes and mouse movements are directed to the host operating system. One can trivially imagine a new generation of smartphones and tablets that by default keep one from accessing the host operating system, rather locking one into one of the guest operating systems. This is already essentially how tablets and cellphones are, it's just that instead of using virtualization like this they use discretionary unix access controls and attempt to prevent users from getting a root account.


If we had such a software architecture with modern cellphones and tablets, we could implement the camera functionality -- or a subset of it -- such that it was isolated in a dedicated virtual machine. This could be done with something similar to pci passthrough with IOMMU -- in terms of desktop/laptop systems.




Having a separate security domain dedicated to the camera -- perhaps even with its persistence layer from a ROM chip --







will allow for taking pictures -- as well as sending pictures to other devices (perhaps after ascertaining over the network that they are the same style of device) -- such that they are in a domain without screenshot functionality implemented in it. Because the domain with camera access is isolated away from the general purpose domain, taking a screenshot in the general purpose domain will fail to screenshot the domain that has the picture stored in it. The domain with the picture stored in it can be very "locked down" to prevent unwanted persistence, such that logic as Snapchat (presumably) uses can actually prevent the persistence of the therein stored images.


The domain with the camera access can even be physically isolated, similar to a Tor Router and workstation.





It could even be with a physical switch that redirects the camera from the general purpose domain to a secondary domain that is for more sensitive photographs, with the more sensitive physical domain being entirely from ROM such that it can't easily be modified to include any screenshot applications, with a protocol with an objective similar to snapshots, but to ascertain the other device being communicated with is part of the secure system. This could be done with something similar to a TPM,







This will go a long way toward preventing logic based bypass attacks. However, there is still the issue of a physical bypass attack. After all, what is to stop someone from using a different device to take a picture of the screen of the phone?



Here we could use something like is already done with currency to prevent it from being scanned. A widespread -- but not, I believe, the best -- system for preventing the scanning of currency is the EURion configuration.








If the isolated 'secure photograph' domain automatically embeds such a pattern into taken photographs -- and cameras are programmed to not photograph the watermarked photographs -- then it can be made more challenging to use a physical bypass of the access control system to bring the image outside of it without authorization.




I know people who have worked on photocopier systems for preventing currency from being copied, and they told me that even after a great deal of manipulation -- to the point that the actual currency image itself can't even be recognized as such -- the algorithms used were still able to detect the watermark such that the photocopiers refused to copy the marked elements.

With protection from application level attacks from the virtual and/or physical isolation, TPM like security to ascertain the integrity of participating devices, and the watermarking technique coupled with firmware in new generation devices that disallows taking photographs of images with a certain watermark, I think that something like snapchat could actually be made a lot more robust.

?:what:
 
Wizard32

Wizard32

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@boojies I appreciate your high-effort post. Even if this was necroposting (it's not, apr 28 to may 22 is less than one month) it would be justified since you added much
 
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