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Serious How to wipe out your hardrive so even the cops can't recoup anything from it?

Summer202

Summer202

NoChinCel
★★★
Joined
Jul 16, 2018
Posts
267
If I ever rope (and it's getting more likely by the day) I don't want nobody to know I was ever on these forums.
I heard the cops usually check the victim's computers in case of suicide and that deleting your internet history is not enough.
Any tech-savy incels care to help me out?
 
throw the hdd on the ocean/river.
 
install linux, full drive encrypt and stop using windows
 
Smash your computer to bits?
 
Either burn it or run a permanent delete tool.

If you’re using windows all your data will be in the cloud by now anyway.

If you don’t use a vpn then the government will have your full web history too.
 
ssd and dm-crypt(luks)
 
If you're going to die, why would you care what people think? Before you die would be the pERfect time to display yourself to world.
 
Why do you care if you rope?
 
You should only be browsing forums like this over a VPN, using a Tor instance, and never connecting to any of your "real life" accounts.

Reinstall your operating system and start now.
 
Overwrite 7 times with dban, crypt it, trow it in a mixer, in the wind with it and do that at several places. Nobody will ever find out
 
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If I ever rope (and it's getting more likely by the day) I don't want nobody to know I was ever on these forums.
I heard the cops usually check the victim's computers in case of suicide and that deleting your internet history is not enough.
Any tech-savy incels care to help me out?
If you're dead, why do you even care? You'll be as good as gone.
 
If you're going to die, why would you care what people think? Before you die would be the pERfect time to display yourself to world.

Why do you care if you rope?

It's not a shame thing. I just don't want people to be able to wrap my suicide in this neat little box of "Guy who couldn't get laid kills himself."
If I do do it, I won't be writing a suicide note either. I don't anyone to get any closure and I don't want my life to have been a consistent story. I want it to be a black box of nothing.

ssd and dm-crypt(luks)

install linux, full drive encrypt and stop using windows

Tnx

Either burn it or run a permanent delete tool.

If you’re using windows all your data will be in the cloud by now anyway.

If you don’t use a vpn then the government will have your full web history too.

I'm not in America. I don't think my country is so anal about things of that sort of thing.
 
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132480
 
delete everything you think could compromise you and then just write large files until you've filled up all of your storage space

no one will be able to retrieve the data.
 
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That seems pretty easy. You sure it will work?
yes buddy. But if you don't care about ruining your drive you might at well swipe some magnets on it, piss on it and throw it in the ocean.
 
Lightning worked for me.

I lost a shitload of movies and books and stuff because of random lightning!

Jfl @ surge protectors!

Most of my writing was on floppies. But they got humidified to death.
 
Physically remove it from existence
 
A permanent delete tool and then full disk encryption.
 
if it is because of this forum. if the police visit u or some shit like that. you can say that you are trolling for lols
 
Smash it

Smash the CPU into bits

With a hammer

JFL at you zoomers, thinking every problem is fixed with software
 
Any software that'll allow you to write zeroes to your entire drive. Don't pay for shit, there have been many free tools to write zeros to your drive since like the 80s.

If you are ultra paranoid write random data to the drive and then zero it. Repeat this process at least three times. If it is a magnetic drive wave a strong af neodynium magnet around it. That should get rid of any magnetic residue that super smart government folk with a ton of money could recover. No one is gonna put in that much effort unless you have like Osama Bin Laden levels of notoriety, though.
 
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You should only be browsing forums like this over a VPN, using a Tor instance, and never connecting to any of your "real life" accounts.
Welp, I think it's too late for that for low-IQ me.
No one is gonna put in that much effort unless you have like Osama Bin Laden levels of notoriety, though.
Well, that's a relief.
 
Just smash it and dump it far away. What are you stupid?
 
i mean it shouldn't be difficult
 
Either burn it or run a permanent delete tool.

If you’re using windows all your data will be in the cloud by now anyway.

If you don’t use a vpn then the government will have your full web history too.
Cloud??
 
Take out the hard drive and throw it in a dumpster. If you think anyone will try to find it your self-importance is laughable tbh. Nobody cares.
Who knows what kind of secrets he keeps there, maybe it's worth searching for
 
Smash it with a hammer
 
I am a computer forensics expert with over a decade of study in the area. Physically damaging a hard drive platter is not going to do anything to stop data recovery, for they can just piece it together like a jigsaw puzzle and put it on a spin stand to read via spin stand microscopy. Encrypting a drive will oftentimes only actually encrypt when data is written to it, so if you had a windows installation and then you install Linux with FDE (Full Disk Encryption) in an attempt to destroy data on it, there is a high probability you will only destroy the data that is overwritten. FDE doesn't actually usually encrypt your entire drive, it only encrypts everything that you write to your drive.

The most secure thing that you can do (short of complete physical destruction [i.e., think melting it down into a liquid --- or at least reaching the Currie point of the magnetic substrate, which is sufficient --- rather than breaking it up with a hammer], or otherwise ruining the drive by exposing a super powerful magnetic force to it) is a three part process.




1) ATA Secure Erase

This is a firmware implemented technique for securely erasing data from hard drives and solid state drives. The implementation between SSD and HDD is somewhat different. It has more ability than anything not implemented in firmware, for it can overwrite bad sectors and such things, whereas things like dm-crypt cannot attempt writing to such sectors that the drive internally recognizes as bad. Usually ATA Secure Erase will either issue a command to NAND memory cells telling them to reset to 1, or it will write a pass of data some number of times to the magnetic platter of a hard drive.

ATA Secure Erase has the potential to be the securest erasure technique that preserves drive functionality, for it can information theoretically wipe the entire drive (which means make it physically impossible to recover the data from it). However, it relies on a correct implementation of the firmware, and this has been hit or miss depending on the specific drive studied (researchers have shown that on some drives it works correctly, but on other drives it fails silently).


This procedure describes how to use the hdparm command to issue a Secure Erase ATA instruction to a target storage device. When a Secure Erase is issued against a SSD drive all its cells will be marked as empty, restoring it to factory default write performance.





2) ATA Secure Erase a second time with the enhanced flag

This is a secondary, unique implementation of a secure erase protocol. Exactly how it is implemented depends on the drive. Many modern drives are SED, or Self Encrypting Drives, which means everything written to them is transparently encrypted during write and decrypted during read. There is usually an ability to set a weak password, but nobody would really use this for encryption per se anyway. The primary use of it is that you can issue an enhanced secure erase command, and it merely needs to rotate (i.e., overwrite) the onboard integrated encryption key, which renders all of the encrypted data that was written to the drive computationally securely inaccessible, which means that it cannot be accessed without breaking the strong encryption used.

On some hard drives this may do a secondary "off-track pass," which puts the magnetic head slightly off track center in order to protect from the theoretical attack of forensic trace evidence being recoverable from magnetic remnants on track edges (the feasibility of this attack is contested, but some implementations of enhanced secure erase aim to protect from the potential for it).

This technique has the potential to render a hard drive entirely securely erased, for even data in bad sectors was encrypted by the rotated key which is now inaccessible because of having been overwritten with the new key. However, as with ATA Secure Erase, you are counting on the firmware implementation being correct, and this has been hit or miss with different drives.


--user-master USER
Specifies which password (user/master) to select. Defaults to
user password. Only useful in combination with --security-
unlock, --security-set-pass, --security-disable, --security-
erase or --security-erase-enhanced.
u user password
m master password





3) Three passes of random data writes with openssl or similar (DBAN used to be good for this, but it isn't maintained any longer and broke down on modern hardware last I knew)

If you are doing this on an SSD, you should use this first, because it will fill the drive up with randomness and make its performance possibly substantially fall even, but upon doing the ATA Secure Erase the performance lost by this step will be restored. With a magnetic platter device, it doesn't matter which you do first.

This technique doesn't rely on firmware and rather uses open source software that can be audited. It probably has the highest probability of being successful of the three techniques, but even upon being successful it isn't capable of erasing data as well as the ATA Secure Erase commands are, for it cannot overwrite bad sectors or other such things.



Does one pass overwrite with randomness to /dev/sd*, uses the AES-NI implementation of the CPU to allow for very fast generation of pseudo-randomness.

There is some controversy regarding how many passes is sufficient. To play it safe I suggest using three passes of randomness. Some people say fewer passes is sufficient on a hard drive, but I would still suggest three to play it safe. On an SSD you really do need at least two and preferably three passes, because they do wear leveling, over provisioning, and other such things. If data destruction is of the utmost importance, such that not even a trace can be recovered, I suggest three passes with randomness.




You want to use all three techniques. You use the two ATA Secure Erase techniques because they have the most ability to render data on the drive inaccessible if they are successful, but either one of them or both of them could be buggy and silently fail. You use the OpenSSL wiping step (with three passes) as a fail safe, for it has the highest probability of living up to its potential, but its potential falls short of the potential of the more failure prone ATA Secure Erase techniques.

You could additionally try doing a pass using just /dev/urandom as the randomness source, to not rely on the AES-NI implementation of the CPU. Or you could use some other software PRNG. But this will probably be very slow to wipe anything. AES-NI can produce pseudorandom data at over a gigabyte a second, /dev/urandom implementations oftentimes only get up to like 13 mbps of pseudorandomness generation.

It is important to use random data for the overwrite if possible, because using things like 0s can be weak to various advanced forensic attacks.
 
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I am a computer forensics expert with over a decade of study in the area. Physically damaging a hard drive platter is not going to do anything to stop data recovery, for they can just piece it together like a jigsaw puzzle and put it on a spin stand to read via spin stand microscopy. Encrypting a drive will oftentimes only actually encrypt when data is written to it, so if you had a windows installation and then you install Linux with FDE (Full Disk Encryption) in an attempt to destroy data on it, there is a high probability you will only destroy the data that is overwritten. FDE doesn't actually usually encrypt your entire drive, it only encrypts everything that you write to your drive.

The most secure thing that you can do (short of complete physical destruction [i.e., think melting it down into a liquid --- or at least reaching the Currie point of the magnetic substrate, which is sufficient --- rather than breaking it up with a hammer], or otherwise ruining the drive by exposing a super powerful magnetic force to it) is a three part process.




1) ATA Secure Erase

This is a firmware implemented technique for securely erasing data from hard drives and solid state drives. The implementation between SSD and HDD is somewhat different. It has more ability than anything not implemented in firmware, for it can overwrite bad sectors and such things, whereas things like dm-crypt cannot attempt writing to such sectors that the drive internally recognizes as bad. Usually ATA Secure Erase will either issue a command to NAND memory cells telling them to reset to 1, or it will write a pass of data some number of times to the magnetic platter of a hard drive.

ATA Secure Erase has the potential to be the securest erasure technique that preserves drive functionality, for it can information theoretically wipe the entire drive (which means make it physically impossible to recover the data from it). However, it relies on a correct implementation of the firmware, and this has been hit or miss depending on the specific drive studied (researchers have shown that on some drives it works correctly, but on other drives it fails silently).








2) ATA Secure Erase a second time with the enhanced flag

This is a secondary, unique implementation of a secure erase protocol. Exactly how it is implemented depends on the drive. Many modern drives are SED, or Self Encrypting Drives, which means everything written to them is transparently encrypted during write and decrypted during read. There is usually an ability to set a weak password, but nobody would really use this for encryption per se anyway. The primary use of it is that you can issue an enhanced secure erase command, and it merely needs to rotate (i.e., overwrite) the onboard integrated encryption key, which renders all of the encrypted data that was written to the drive computationally securely inaccessible, which means that it cannot be accessed without breaking the strong encryption used.

On some hard drives this may do a secondary "off-track pass," which puts the magnetic head slightly off track center in order to protect from the theoretical attack of forensic trace evidence being recoverable from magnetic remnants on track edges (the feasibility of this attack is contested, but some implementations of enhanced secure erase aim to protect from the potential for it).

This technique has the potential to render a hard drive entirely securely erased, for even data in bad sectors was encrypted by the rotated key which is now inaccessible because of having been overwritten with the new key. However, as with ATA Secure Erase, you are counting on the firmware implementation being correct, and this has been hit or miss with different drives.








3) Three passes of random data writes with openssl or similar (DBAN used to be good for this, but it isn't maintained any longer and broke down on modern hardware last I knew)

If you are doing this on an SSD, you should use this first, because it will fill the drive up with randomness and make its performance possibly substantially fall even, but upon doing the ATA Secure Erase the performance lost by this step will be restored. With a magnetic platter device, it doesn't matter which you do first.

This technique doesn't rely on firmware and rather uses open source software that can be audited. It probably has the highest probability of being successful of the three techniques, but even upon being successful it isn't capable of erasing data as well as the ATA Secure Erase commands are, for it cannot overwrite bad sectors or other such things.



Does one pass overwrite with randomness to /dev/sd*, uses the AES-NI implementation of the CPU to allow for very fast generation of pseudo-randomness.

There is some controversy regarding how many passes is sufficient. To play it safe I suggest using three passes of randomness. Some people say fewer passes is sufficient on a hard drive, but I would still suggest three to play it safe. On an SSD you really do need at least two and preferably three passes, because they do wear leveling, over provisioning, and other such things. If data destruction is of the utmost importance, such that not even a trace can be recovered, I suggest three passes with randomness.




You want to use all three techniques. You use the two ATA Secure Erase techniques because they have the most ability to render data on the drive inaccessible if they are successful, but either one of them or both of them could be buggy and silently fail. You use the OpenSSL wiping step (with three passes) as a fail safe, for it has the highest probability of living up to its potential, but its potential falls short of the potential of the more failure prone ATA Secure Erase techniques.

You could additionally try doing a pass using just /dev/urandom as the randomness source, to not rely on the AES-NI implementation of the CPU. Or you could use some other software PRNG. But this will probably be very slow to wipe anything. AES-NI can produce pseudorandom data at over a gigabyte a second, /dev/urandom implementations oftentimes only get up to like 13 mbps of pseudorandomness generation.

It is important to use random data for the overwrite if possible, because using things like 0s can be weak to various advanced forensic attacks.



2 much work, OP just delete everything and then create one giant text file to overwrite the old data.
 
I am a computer forensics expert with over a decade of study in the area. Physically damaging a hard drive platter is not going to do anything to stop data recovery, for they can just piece it together like a jigsaw puzzle and put it on a spin stand to read via spin stand microscopy. Encrypting a drive will oftentimes only actually encrypt when data is written to it, so if you had a windows installation and then you install Linux with FDE (Full Disk Encryption) in an attempt to destroy data on it, there is a high probability you will only destroy the data that is overwritten. FDE doesn't actually usually encrypt your entire drive, it only encrypts everything that you write to your drive.

The most secure thing that you can do (short of complete physical destruction [i.e., think melting it down into a liquid --- or at least reaching the Currie point of the magnetic substrate, which is sufficient --- rather than breaking it up with a hammer], or otherwise ruining the drive by exposing a super powerful magnetic force to it) is a three part process.




1) ATA Secure Erase

This is a firmware implemented technique for securely erasing data from hard drives and solid state drives. The implementation between SSD and HDD is somewhat different. It has more ability than anything not implemented in firmware, for it can overwrite bad sectors and such things, whereas things like dm-crypt cannot attempt writing to such sectors that the drive internally recognizes as bad. Usually ATA Secure Erase will either issue a command to NAND memory cells telling them to reset to 1, or it will write a pass of data some number of times to the magnetic platter of a hard drive.

ATA Secure Erase has the potential to be the securest erasure technique that preserves drive functionality, for it can information theoretically wipe the entire drive (which means make it physically impossible to recover the data from it). However, it relies on a correct implementation of the firmware, and this has been hit or miss depending on the specific drive studied (researchers have shown that on some drives it works correctly, but on other drives it fails silently).








2) ATA Secure Erase a second time with the enhanced flag

This is a secondary, unique implementation of a secure erase protocol. Exactly how it is implemented depends on the drive. Many modern drives are SED, or Self Encrypting Drives, which means everything written to them is transparently encrypted during write and decrypted during read. There is usually an ability to set a weak password, but nobody would really use this for encryption per se anyway. The primary use of it is that you can issue an enhanced secure erase command, and it merely needs to rotate (i.e., overwrite) the onboard integrated encryption key, which renders all of the encrypted data that was written to the drive computationally securely inaccessible, which means that it cannot be accessed without breaking the strong encryption used.

On some hard drives this may do a secondary "off-track pass," which puts the magnetic head slightly off track center in order to protect from the theoretical attack of forensic trace evidence being recoverable from magnetic remnants on track edges (the feasibility of this attack is contested, but some implementations of enhanced secure erase aim to protect from the potential for it).

This technique has the potential to render a hard drive entirely securely erased, for even data in bad sectors was encrypted by the rotated key which is now inaccessible because of having been overwritten with the new key. However, as with ATA Secure Erase, you are counting on the firmware implementation being correct, and this has been hit or miss with different drives.








3) Three passes of random data writes with openssl or similar (DBAN used to be good for this, but it isn't maintained any longer and broke down on modern hardware last I knew)

If you are doing this on an SSD, you should use this first, because it will fill the drive up with randomness and make its performance possibly substantially fall even, but upon doing the ATA Secure Erase the performance lost by this step will be restored. With a magnetic platter device, it doesn't matter which you do first.

This technique doesn't rely on firmware and rather uses open source software that can be audited. It probably has the highest probability of being successful of the three techniques, but even upon being successful it isn't capable of erasing data as well as the ATA Secure Erase commands are, for it cannot overwrite bad sectors or other such things.



Does one pass overwrite with randomness to /dev/sd*, uses the AES-NI implementation of the CPU to allow for very fast generation of pseudo-randomness.

There is some controversy regarding how many passes is sufficient. To play it safe I suggest using three passes of randomness. Some people say fewer passes is sufficient on a hard drive, but I would still suggest three to play it safe. On an SSD you really do need at least two and preferably three passes, because they do wear leveling, over provisioning, and other such things. If data destruction is of the utmost importance, such that not even a trace can be recovered, I suggest three passes with randomness.




You want to use all three techniques. You use the two ATA Secure Erase techniques because they have the most ability to render data on the drive inaccessible if they are successful, but either one of them or both of them could be buggy and silently fail. You use the OpenSSL wiping step (with three passes) as a fail safe, for it has the highest probability of living up to its potential, but its potential falls short of the potential of the more failure prone ATA Secure Erase techniques.

You could additionally try doing a pass using just /dev/urandom as the randomness source, to not rely on the AES-NI implementation of the CPU. Or you could use some other software PRNG. But this will probably be very slow to wipe anything. AES-NI can produce pseudorandom data at over a gigabyte a second, /dev/urandom implementations oftentimes only get up to like 13 mbps of pseudorandomness generation.

It is important to use random data for the overwrite if possible, because using things like 0s can be weak to various advanced forensic attacks.

This is a pretty interesting read but who the fuck would try recovering anything from a smashed drive of some random ugly dude who roped
 
If you have any care for your legacy after death, you have no business killing yourself. If you care about the effect your death might have, that means you care about something in this living world, and you serve it better by not dying.
 
Welp, I think it's too late for that for low-IQ me.
It's never too late, you'd always be wise to start, better late than never. It's easy, too. You can get a VPN for like $4 a month (protonvpn and privateinternetaccess are well reviewed), which is worth every penny, and it's just a thing you install on your computer and phone and it takes care of the rest. Tor you just download and open, there's no installation or anything, it's just a zip file with everything you need inside it. As it will tell you on the front page, you still need to get your browsing habits in order to really take advantage of the extra security.

A lot of people here and in general will tell you it's too much trouble, but you couldn't pay me to come on a site like this, or even something pedestrian like an imageboard, without that kind of security. Thoughtcrime is real in currentyear.
 
I will need this info for later ..
 
It's never too late, you'd always be wise to start, better late than never. It's easy, too. You can get a VPN for like $4 a month (protonvpn and privateinternetaccess are well reviewed), which is worth every penny, and it's just a thing you install on your computer and phone and it takes care of the rest. Tor you just download and open, there's no installation or anything, it's just a zip file with everything you need inside it. As it will tell you on the front page, you still need to get your browsing habits in order to really take advantage of the extra security.
I'll have to look into it, but honestly, I'm already probably screwed for "thoughtcrime."
 
Dismantle the hard drive and smash the platter with a hammer.
 
Disk cleaner is a simple program every windows computer comes with.
 
There are some programs which allow you do basically delete and encrypt info on your HDD that makes random variables and changes to left over files and names of those files. Makes recovery nearly impossible (if not fully impossible) and then there's always smashing your HDD too.
Another thing is to use a VPN and something like TOR, or another software like it.
It's not just used for dark web shit, but also can be used with a VPN to make yourself nearly invisible.
If you do ever decide to rope, i suggest you use the things i mentioned above. Along with deleting all accounts that you can still sign into that you are aware of, AND deleting browser history and shit like that. (or maybe just use a program to encrypt every single aspect of your PC before smashing it, just to be extra sure) :feelzez:
 

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